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Fiscal Policy from a Public Choice Perspective 
1. Introduction 
Fiscal policy is one of three major policy tools (the others being monetary policy and regulation) 
used by government to influence the private economy.  For some time now monetary policy--money 
rules and inflation targeting--has been the focus of policy attention at the aggregate level (Blinder, 
2006), while regulation/deregulation issues have preoccupied policy analysts at the micro level.  
However the events of last few years, particularly those associated with the 2007-2008 financial crisis, 
have reawakened interest in fiscal policy.  In part this is due to the perceived failure of financial 
regulation to prevent the crisis and the concomitant failure of traditional monetary policy (the hitting of 
the zero interest bound) to moderate the subsequent recession. There are now new fears over the 
consequences of the huge deficits accumulating to deal with the ongoing recession.  
Fiscal policy refers to the government’s ability to tax and spend either to influence the economy 
directly or to realign the incentives facing private agents and so restructure the economy indirectly.  
From a public choice perspective fiscal policy raises a host of collective choice problems associated with 
how citizens use or abuse the powers of the state to achieve private and collective objectives.  From a 
macro perspective, public choice considerations raise issues associated with endogenizing government 
within formal macro models.  
The reasons why individuals in a community might wish to use government to intervene fiscally 
in the economy are usually grouped into one of two categories: reasons for government to have a 
permanent presence in the economy and reasons why temporary government intervention might be 
desirable.  The former are viewed as long run in nature and are usually discussed in terms of the factors 
that explain the size of government in the economy and/or its growth through time (Borcherding, 1985).  
The reasons for transitory government intervention in the economy relate to the perceived gains that 
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can arise from smoothing the business cycle.  The latter issues are the ones that usually fall under the 
heading of fiscal policy.   
It is apparent, however, that while it is possible to separate the motives for government 
spending and taxation conceptually into those directed at long versus short run objectives, the actual 
policies adopted typically combine both. For example, adopting progressivity in income tax rates may 
help to achieve greater business cycle stability but at the same time promote a larger sized government 
by lowering the political cost of maintaining that size.  Similarly fears that the absence of an effective 
constraint on government spending has encouraged myopic politicians to adopt excessive debt has led 
to the imposition of constitutional constraints on political behavior, such as through the adoption of 
balanced budget amendments. These in turn restrict government’s ability to address instability over the 
shorter run (Poterba, 1997; Hou and Smith, 2010).  Perhaps even more fundamentally, if tax decreases 
and expenditure increases were equally effective in influencing aggregate demand, the choice of which 
policy instrument to use in relation to the business cycle would depend in part upon whether the long 
run size of government was believed to be too large or too small.1
Even if the theories explaining long and short run government policy were strictly separable, the 
measures of taxation and spending used for hypothesis testing combine both policies in a single time 
series.  Hence neither type of policy can be tested independently.  This is not something that can be 
overcome by disaggregation, since each separate element combines both. The result is that the test of 
  These examples suggest that policy 
choices involving the scale or even the instrument to be used in short run intervention will involve 
considerations that interact with the long run.  They involve more than just the transitory deadweight 
losses associated with business cycle analysis.  From a public choice perspective the two sets of 
considerations are even more interrelated because both short and long run decisions are made by the 
same set of agents. 
                                                          
1  For example, the belief that government is too large means that recessions would be better fought with tax 
reductions than with further spending increases. 
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any short run fiscal hypothesis must recognize that longer run spending/taxation choices are jointly 
present in the data and that any actual test will incorporate, at least implicitly, a long run hypothesis 
relative to government size.  It follows that how the long run is removed from the data becomes an 
important part of any test of the level or effectiveness of fiscal intervention. Hence from a public choice 
perspective, both conceptual and data concerns suggest that the two types of policy decisions should be 
tested jointly (Winer and Ferris, 2007; Ferris, Park and Winer, 2008). 
Finally, a public choice perspective also means recognizing that fiscal policies reflect collective 
choices exercised through political means and implemented through bureaucratic institutions. Because 
of this, the characteristics of both the political and the institutional environment will play an important 
role in the analysis of long and short run fiscal choices.  
2. Plan  
In the following pages I discuss a subset of these issues beginning from a basic model designed 
to illustrate the methodology typically used in fiscal analysis and to provide a departure point for public 
choice considerations. I begin by endogenizing government within a traditional macroeconomic model.  
The model is typically macroeconomic in the sense that it avoids distributional issues, is general 
equilibrium in nature, and achieves tractability by assuming away various types of transactions and 
coordination costs. For example, macro models typically assume away the costs of using private markets 
and the principle-agent problems that arise within the firm.  Under competitive conditions this collapses 
the distinction between the household and the firm on the private side of the model.2
                                                          
2  Another simplification that has received considerable attention recently is the assumption that credit markets 
and the financial intermediaries that bring together savers and investors operate costlessly.  The recent failure of 
such financial coordinating mechanisms has made the question of how to incorporate such problems tractably into 
macro analysis perhaps the most important current issue in macroeconomics. 
 For our purposes, 
the more important initial assumption is that the political process lying behind the use of the state to 
provide government services is competitive and works costlessly so that no principle-agent type 
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problems arise between households, politicians and policy makers.  While an obvious exaggeration, this 
case provides a convenient benchmark against which different longer run theories of government can 
be compared. It also highlights the macroeconomic significance of the steady state from which the 
transitory shocks that lead to short run departures and the demand for fiscal intervention are typically 
discussed. Throughout examples of the hypotheses, tests, and empirical findings relevant to a public 
choice perspective are given.  The last section of the paper deals explicitly with the measurement issues 
associated with testing theories of fiscal behavior and the problems presented by combining economic 
and political data.   
 3. A traditional macro model of government size and fiscal policy: the Long Run 
I begin by building a simple closed economy macro model where the community consists of two 
parts: a household sector and a government sector. The household sector consists of a representative 
agent that maximizes a time separable utility function together with an aggregate production function 
from which private consumption, government services, private and government investment can be 
fashioned.3
                                                          
3 For the existence of a unique money economy I assume that the three goods are complements and that the 
household can be satiated in their holdings of real money balances. 
 The household chooses the hours of work (leisure), ht (lt) , private consumption, ct, along 
with the holdings of real money balances, mt+1, and real government bonds, bt+1, and private investment, 
kt+1 – (1-δ)kt, that will maximize its expected lifetime utility subject to a production technology and given 
levels of lump sum transfers/taxes, τt, an income tax rate, st, and the levels of services, gt, and capital 
stock, , provided by government.  Given their knowledge of household behavior, the government 
then chooses the tax rate, the levels of government service, government investment, and the issuance 
of money and bonds that will maximize its objective function.  To start I assume that the government’s 
objective function coincides with household’s. This provides a neutral starting position from which 
alternative theories of the role of government can depart.  It also provides a convenient point to engage 
5 
 
traditional macro analysis, where typically it is simply assumed that governments maximize household 
utility and policy should be evaluated relative to household preferences. 
i. The Community Decision Problem 
The household to maximize a continuous concave welfare function of the form,  
 where   and , (1) 
subject to HBC:     (2a) 
  TC: ,             (2b)  
                PF:       where        (3) 
  GBC:     (4) 
The model has one random (exogenous) shock that introduces uncertainty and variability into the model 
(  in production) but others could be added to the model and typically are.  The representative agent 
assumption implies that private debt must cancel so that the bonds in this problem are government 
bonds (the analysis also assumes that the interest paid to the central bank on its holdings of government 
bonds is repaid to the government as operating profit).  The maximization problem is subject to initial 
conditions, M0 and B0, and to transversality conditions. 
  Using a value function,  this economy can represented as a dynamic 
optimization problem with two sets of decision makers: households and the government.  The 
constrained optimization version of the problem can then be represented through the lagrangian 
 
 
      .  (5) 
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The first order conditions for an internal household optimum are: 
,          (6a) 
,        (6b)4
 ,         (6c) 
 
,         (6d) 
.             (6e) 
The corresponding first order conditions for government are: 
,       (7a) 
,             (7b) 
,          (7c) 
,         (7d) 
.            (7e) 
The envelope conditions for the household (advanced one period) are: 
,           (8a) 
,          (8b)  
  (8c) 
To interpret these conditions, first note that from (6a) and (7b) that the lagrangians are found as 
 and .  Combining the equations in (8) with those in (7) we find for the household: 
 ,          (9a) 
,              (9b) 
                                                          
4 This assumes that the household recognizes its contribution to the production of public goods through the tax 
revenue it generates from working. 
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 ,             (9c) 
. (9d) 
The first of these conditions is the Euler equation for allocating consumption optimally over 
time.  This is achieved by equating the marginal utility of a unit of consumption foregone today with the 
present value of the expected utility received by consuming the gross return realized next period.  The 
second condition sets the marginal value of lost leisure equal to the marginal utility gain from enhanced 
private and public output. Equation (9c) requires the utility generated by holding a real dollar today to 
equal the utility loss from postponing consumption for one period (and receiving no interest on money 
holdings.)  The final condition states that the optimal investment strategy for the household is to 
accumulate capital as long as the discounted expected utility gain from investment (increasing both 
expected future private output net of taxes that can be consumed and future taxes that results in more 
government spending) exceeds the utility foregone today from making that investment. 
Turning next to the government, after using the lagrangian solutions of (6a) and (7b) in (7a), the 
optimal tax rate should be set by the government such that the marginal utility gained from additional 
government spending is just equal to the utility loss in present consumption. That is, st is set such that 
  which implies  .   (10) 
Deriving the envelope conditions for government and advancing them one period we find: 
  ,          (11a) 
,          (11b)  
.  (11c) 
Substituting these conditions back into (7c)-(7e),  
,         (12a) 
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,          (12b) 
  (12c) 
Note that the first of these conditions, (12a), in conjunction with (12b) requires the government 
to increase the supply of real money balances as long as   (see the discussion following (22)).  
The second condition is the corresponding Euler equation for government and states that government 
bonds should be issued as long as the utility gain from having more government consumption today 
exceeds the loss in utility tomorrow when the borrowing must be repaid in terms of foregone future 
government consumption.5
If we now use the optimal tax rate setting condition from (10), then it also follows that the 
accumulation decisions for the government and the household are consistent. More specifically, from 
(12c) and (9c)  
 The third condition represents the optimal investment rule for the 
government. The government should increase the government capital stock as long as the present value 
of the expected utility gain from additional private consumption and additional tax revenue (and hence 
future government output) generated by that investment exceeds the utility cost of foregoing 
government consumption today.   
.  (13) 
Similarly from (12b) and (9a), the expected returns from household and government borrowing/lending 
are equalized,  
.         (14) 
 
                                                          
5 Substituting (12b) into (12a) shows that the expected utility gain from reallocating government consumption 
through time by bonds and money must be equalized. 
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ii. Steady State Values 
With this background we can solve for steady state values by setting the shock equal to zero, 
i.e., zt = 0, and then imposing the steady state conditions 
 etc.  Applying this to (9a), the household Euler equation gives us,  
   or, if ,  ,      (15) 
which are alternative ways of writing the Fisher equation.  Using (10) in the steady state version of (13),   
,    (16) 
and using either (12b) and (12c) together with (9a) and (9c) and (15), 
    
so that .   (17) 
If we assume that the production function,  satisfies the Inada conditions for 
both inputs, then the steady state values of kss and kgss implied by (17) will be unique. This in turn implies 
that steady state output is uniquely determined as 
 .         (18) 
In the steady state real money holdings must be constant over time.  This implies that 
 which in turn means that   That is, in the steady state the 
rate of growth of the money supply,  will equal the inflation rate, , so that .  If we assume 
that in the steady state money growth enters the model only through lump sum transfers made by the 
government, then   
  ∀ j in the steady state.     (19)  
Finally we note that government bonds have no value in the model other than reallocating 
consumption and tax payments through time.  Hence the constancy of the stock of government bonds in 
the steady state implies   It follows that the government budget constraint becomes 
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  .          (20) 
Using the same information, the household budget constraint reduces to  
.         (21) 
where both gss and css both depend upon the tax rate chosen, s.  Finally, in the steady state the optimal 
tax requires  
.            (10) 
While it would seem that (20),(21) and (10) are sufficient to define a solution to css, gss, and sss 
(and thus result in what is called superneutrality) the marginal utilities in (10) are not independent of 
the level of real balances, mss, and hence are not independent of the rate of inflation, θss, or the rate of 
interest iss.6
 .        (22) 
  Hence to close the model, we note that (10) also implies that the steady state demand for 
money in (9a) and (9b) will equal the supply of money in (12a) and (12b).  In addition, using (9a) and 
(9b), we see that 
Hence the four equations (20), (21), (10) and (22) can be used to solve for the values of css, gss, sss and 
mss.7
                                                          
6 The resource constraint for the economy is the sum of the two individual budget constraints which, for the steady 
state, becomes syss + (1-s)yss = css + δkss + gss + δkg ss or yss = css + investmentss + gss.  
  Because c and g are complementary with mss, (22) implies that real money holdings will fall as the 
steady state money growth rate and money rate of interest rise. Similarly because real money holdings 
generate utility and are complementary with the other goods in the model, the optimal rate of inflation 
will be the one that generates the highest level of real money holdings, often called the Friedman rule.  
This implies an inflation rate that drives the money rate of interest to zero, i.e.,  is optimal.  In 
this case  and real money holdings are satiated. 
7  In a more general context that distinguished the services of capital and labor, Char, Christiano and Kehoe (1994) 
solve for a steady state in which the optimal expected tax rates set on capital and labour differ (with an optimal 
expected tax rate on capital of zero). 
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The model above solves for the levels of gss and kg ss that maximize representative household 
utility subject only to underlying community fundamentals--household tastes and production technology 
(and the assumed mechanisms for collecting taxes). Its optimality provides a convenient starting point 
for the discussion of fiscal policy because to the extent that external random shocks drive the economy 
temporarily away from this long run equilibrium, any movement back towards equilibrium will increase 
community welfare (should fiscal intervention be implemented at low enough cost).  As presently 
structured, however, there are no reasons in our analysis for policy to be relevant.  The absence of 
externalities and public goods means that the productivity shock brings a change in real transformation 
possibilities to which households will wish to adjust and the model contains no impediments to 
adjusting optimally.  As currently structured, the absence of information and flexibility constraints on 
adjustment implies no departure between any private and social cost and hence no efficiency gain from 
induced readjustment.     
It follows that for fiscal intervention to increase welfare, the model must contain additional 
elements (information and transaction costs, frictions, or rigidities in the short run) that mirror real 
world constraints on the ability of private agents in the economy to adjust to altered circumstances 
while not constraining as severely the ability of government to recognize and respond. Typical ways of 
adding frictions to the analysis include the addition of temporal restrictions on the information set 
available to households relative to government and the adoption of Calvo pricing or costs of adjustment 
to restrain price flexibility in the short run (in models with price setting).  Alternatively information and 
other transactions costs can be used to generate reasons for explicit or implicit private contracts. Such 
obstacles to short run adjustment then lead to a series of temporary equilibrium that define a transition 
process from impact effect back to long run equilibrium.  In such a context short run fiscal policy can 
have an efficiency role by minimizing the departure from and/or speeding the process of adjustment 
back to long run equilibrium. 
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 iii. Public choice and long run government size 
Before turning to a description of how fiscal policy can be used to affect short run deviations 
arising about the steady state, it is worth considering what fiscal features of this long run equilibrium 
have been tested and receive empirical support.  To the extent this departure point is biased, the 
resulting short run analysis would need to be modified.     
The feature of the model that has perhaps received the greatest attention is the hypothesis of 
Ricardian equivalence and its corollary that government bonds are not net wealth (Barro 1974).  In our 
model, if τt is increased with  and  ∀ t kept constant (representing a reduction in current lump sum 
taxes), the necessity of maintaining its budget constraint means that the government must borrow more 
today.  The addition of the no Ponzi game condition then implies that future taxes (of equivalent present 
value) must be raised to pay off higher borrowing.8 Because government tax collections are household 
tax payments, the formal combining of household and government budget constraints forces household 
recognition that the presently received reduction in taxes will be matched with an equivalently valued 
increase in taxes in the future such that its net wealth is unaffected.9
The limitations of Ricardian equivalence are now well known (Bernheim, 1987 and Seater, 1993) 
and are reflected in the assumptions built into the formal analysis above. For example, if the households 
choosing today face a limited rather than infinite lifetime, then any lowering of taxes today can result in 
the postponement of tax repayment into a future generation.  It follows that unless utility of future 
generations is fully reflected in today’s choices (intergenerational altruism), the choices made today will 
  It follows that because the 
consumption possibilities available to the household in the model depend only on the present value of 
its net income, there is no reason for any consumption choice to be altered.   
                                                          
8  Successive substitution into the short run budget constraint results in a long run budget constraint that nets out 
inter-period bond holdings except for initial holdings and net borrowing at infinity.  The no Ponzi game condition 
requires this later term to be zero.  
9  A corollary of the hypothesis is that fiscal deficits are stationary.  See Bohn (1998) who provides strong evidence 
of fiscal stability for the U.S. and Neck and Getzner (2001) for Austria. 
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be different than otherwise. Similarly if reallocating income across time through the government budget 
constraint can be done at lower (or higher) cost than reallocation through private markets, household 
wealth will be increased (decreased) and household consumption affected correspondingly.  
Early tests by Kormendi (1983) and Aschauer (1985) positioned Ricardian equivalence with 
respect to a tax decrease relative to a Keynesian alternative (where government bonds were viewed as 
net wealth and household consumption was separable from government spending) and found evidence 
broadly consistent with Ricardian equivalence.  These results initiated a large number of further studies 
with results that often depended upon the time period chosen and/or variables covered (Haug, 1990; 
Feldstein, 1982).  Nevertheless, in an extensive survey of the large literature that had grown up on this 
topic Seater (1993, p. 143) found that despite the near certain invalidity of Ricardian equivalence as a 
literal description of the economy, a “dispassionate reading of the literature” leads to the conclusion 
that Ricardian equivalence may hold as a “good approximation”.10
The significance of the long run outcome captured in the model above is that the addition of 
exogenous random shocks, either real or nominal, will perturb endogenous variables symmetrically 
about an optimum.  Hence the case for short run fiscal policy can be analyzed in the context of foregone 
utility from symmetric departures from an otherwise efficient long run equilibrium (as they could not if 
starting from a position of either too large or too small a government size).
  
11
                                                          
10  The theoretical limitations highlighted by the Ricardian equivalence debate provide a stronger motivation for 
the role of debt finance/tax reduction in relation to short run policies to address temporary departures from long 
run equilibrium (e.g., the importance of distribution, liquidity, uncertainty, and information asymmetries in the 
transition). 
  However, the assumption 
that government chooses to maximize household utility is highly problematic from a public choice 
perspective both because government services are allocated through political markets that function 
differently than economic markets and because the agents that make the choices on behalf of the 
11  Hence the concern in New Keynesian models such as Woodford’s (2003) that monopoly producers receive a 
production subsidy to align the monopolistically competitive output of the private sector with the output that 
would be produced under competition. 
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government have no particular reason to maximize household utility at the cost of their own.  For this 
reason, a long list of public choice economists (Tullock, 1959; Ohlson, 1965; Caplan, 2001 to mention 
only a few) have argued that utility maximizing politicians accountable only to myopic voters who suffer 
from fiscal illusion (or rational ignorance), or who use voting rules that give decision making power to 
the median voter (Black, 1948, Meltzer and Richard, 1983) and/or who implement policy with behavioral 
incentives that allow for bureaucratic or regulatory capture (Niskanen, 1975; Peltzman, 1980) result in a 
government size that is too large from the household’s perspective. In the context of macro analysis, 
this implies that the objective function determining choice in the government sector weighs more highly 
the value of government services and the productivity of government capital than do households. The 
result would be a steady state where instead of equations (10) and (17) holding, we would find  
    and .    (23) 
Alternatively it could be argued that as the monopoly supplier of some services, governments 
either lack the incentives and the information needed to respond fully to household demands (Downs, 
1960; Ram, 1989) or are run by politicians/bureaucrats with private opportunities for corruption 
(Giuranno, 2009) such that too low a level of government service is provided.12
Finally, a growing number of public choice economists (Wittman, 1989; Breton, 1996; Hettich 
and Winer, 1999; Besley, Persson, and Sturm, 2005), many of whom use probabilistic voting models 
(Coughlin and Nitzan, 1981; Enelow and Hinich, 1989; Adams, Merill and Grofman, 2005) argue that 
 In this case the objective 
function determining government choices would give a lower weight to government consumption and 
investment and the conditions in (23) would be reversed.  On the margin, the household’s evaluation of 
government services would exceed that of private goods while productivity in the government sector 
would exceed that of the private sector. 
                                                          
12 A literature search in Econlit reveals very few of the many recent papers on government size take seriously the 
hypothesis that government size may be too low.  Those that do are typically concerned with issues of corruption 
in developing economies (e.g., Yavas, 1998). 
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competition among political parties is the key requirement for politicians and bureaucrats to behave as 
if they maximized household utility.  Here a sufficient level of political competition is needed to reward 
those who provide voter valued services at lower cost and penalize those who do not.  When that is 
present, one would find the equations in (23) meeting more or less with equality.   
It is then households’ evaluation of current levels of private versus government consumption 
and the productivity of private versus government investment that are the tests for whether the size of 
government is too large or too small.  However the fact that government services are not marketed 
makes the evaluation of the first of these conditions somewhat problematic (Carr, 1989).  As a 
consequence most researchers have turned to analyze the effect of a permanent change in government 
spending on output, wealth, productivity, and/or growth and used this outcome to assess optimal size.  
Aschauer (1988) notes, for example, that in general equilibrium a permanent rise in government 
spending (an injection valued at 1) will withdraw equivalent resources from the private sector that will 
reduce private consumption (whose value in his analysis is represented by γ) and/or private investment 
(whose value in his analysis is represented by μ).   Aschauer then reports estimated values of γ in the 
range of .25 to .4 (Aschauer, 1985 and Kormendi, 1983) and an estimate of μ of approximately .4 
(Ahmed, 1986).  Because μ + γ < 1, he concludes that government size is “too large” with a permanent 
increase in government size reducing the aggregate size of the pie available to the community and 
hence net wealth.13 On the other hand, Karras (1996b) examines a large number of countries and finds 
that government is overprovided in Africa, underprovided in Asia, and more or less optimally provided in 
the rest of the world.14
                                                          
13 This analysis abstracts from further losses that would arise if tax rates are distorting.  
 Moreover, in a series of papers that focus on the productivity of government 
investment in Europe, Karras (1996a and 1997) finds the hypothesis that the marginal products of 
14  Recent work on OECD countries by De Witte and Moesen (2010) suggests that only Australia, New Zealand, 
Norway and the U.K. would benefit from larger sized governments.  
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private and government capital are equal cannot be rejected.15
There have been many more empirical studies on the relationship between government size and 
growth.  Most of these concur with Landau (1983) and Barro (1991, 1997) who find that increase in the 
ratio of government consumption to GDP will depress output growth (see also Folster and Henrekson, 
2001).  However, a number of authors have questioned these findings, stressing the ‘fragility’ of the 
relationship of most fiscal measures with growth (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993) and point to reliability 
issues coming from simultaneity and selection problems in combination with weak instruments (Agell, 
Ohlsson and Thoursie, 2006).  Even so most recent studies tend to confirm the negative association of 
growth with government consumption (see Afonso and Furceri, 2008; Romero-Avila and Strauch, 2009; 
Ghosh Roy, 2009).  But while the consumption relationship may be negative, the relationship between 
government investment and growth is most often found to be positive.  Ram’s early work (1986, 1989) 
stresses a positive externality arising (implicitly) from government investment to growth while Easterly 
and Rebelo (1993) find a strong positive effect arising from the government’s provision of transportation 
and communication capital. Still others point to a strong positive relationship between government 
provided education expenditures and growth (Landau, 1983; Evans and Karras, 1994).  Expanding 
dimensionality from size to variability, Romero-Avila and Straud (2009) investigate the relationship 
between growth and the size and volatility of most components of government spending/taxes and find 
that while most components have a negative association with trend economic growth, public 
investment is one of the few that has had a positive impact on European growth.        
  Ram (1986) provides one of the few 
studies that concludes that larger government size would improve economic performance and finds a 
higher level of factor productivity within government than that found in the private sector, at least for 
the period of the 1960s. 
                                                          
15 Unlike Kormendi (1983) and Aschauer (1985), Karras 1994 finds that private and government consumption are 
complements rather than substitutes. 
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Despite a widespread presumption in the public choice literature that government size is too 
large, there appears no strong empirical consensus on whether government size overall is too large, too 
small, or just about right for most countries.16
4. Fiscal Policy and the Short Run  
 While there does seem a consensus that further increases 
in government consumption would be harmful to growth, there remains sufficient evidence on the 
positive benefits of government investment to support one’s favorite theory of government size.  
Because of the advantage offered by generating symmetric welfare losses in departures from long run 
equilibrium, I retain the steady state derived in the analysis above as the point of departure for short 
run or transition analysis.  
i. DSGE Modeling  
Given stability so that the endogenous variables converge on long run equilibrium, permanent 
and transitory changes to the model’s fundamentals set in motion a pattern of adjustment in time.  This 
dynamic adjustment process is typically modeled by linearizing the system (using first or, increasingly, 
second order approximations) about its steady state and then solving the resulting set of difference 
equations. While a solution that describes the transition process between steady states (comparative 
dynamics) or back to the old equilibrium (stability analysis) can often be shown to exist, an analytic 
solution is usually not possible.  To make the analysis operational, a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) model is constructed by calibrating the model, i.e., applying empirical estimates of 
the model’s key parameters, and then simulating the characteristic movements of the specific economy 
under study. Here the usefulness of the model is judged by how closely the model replicates certain 
characteristic empirical moments of the economy through time (e.g. the humped shaped response of 
output to external shocks). If successful, the resulting structure is used to explore such questions as the 
                                                          
16 The empirical finding that appears most frequently, that an increase in government consumption share of GDP 
will decrease the growth rate, need not imply that government consumption services are oversupplied.  In the 
same way that a change in tastes from future to present (private) consumption would reduce growth but raise 
welfare, the loss of final output need not mean that the new combination of outputs is not more highly valued.   
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effect on the model’s key variables (and ultimately welfare) of changes in government spending, taxes, 
and deficits (accumulated debt).    
When we linearize the real business cycle model developed in Section 3, the resulting DSGE 
model has the productivity shock affect output not only directly but also indirectly by increasing the 
marginal productivity of labour and so the incentive to work both intra- and inter-temporally.  As 
importantly, the productivity change will affect lifetime earnings and hence both private consumption 
and labour supply through the resulting wealth effect (Baxter and King, 1993).  It is though these wealth 
effects that permanent and transitory changes in government spending (and taxes) produce different 
effects on aggregate demand and supply (depending in part on the information structure of the 
economy and thus the degree to which Ricardian equivalence is expected to hold).     
But while DSGE models can be used to describe the effects of alternative policy rules and policy 
shocks on the time pattern of employment and output, the role of fiscal policy in the short run is not 
simply to remove the fluctuations produced by external shocks. Some shocks, such as the productivity 
shock above, represent changed circumstances to which welfare will be lost if no adjustment is made.17
                                                          
17  Hence Woodford’s emphasis on optimal policy defined through government’s ability to close the gap between 
actual and flexible price equilibrium rather than between the actual outcome and the stationary state.  
  
Rather, the economic motivation for policy is an improvement in welfare and that possibility requires 
the presence of private adjustment costs to individuals and private institutions that prevent or slow 
down readjustment relative to what could be produced by policy.  Hence for policy to be relevant in the 
short run, the dynamics modeled must embody frictions, imperfections, conventions, information 
and/or other transaction costs that generate one or more externalities whose negative effects policy can 
minimize.  The need for these types of adjustments to the basic model is suggested by studies that note 
empirical regularities in most economies that cannot be accounted for by flexible price, real business 
cycle models (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1996; Gali and Rabanal, 2004).  Typical features that are then 
added to the basic model of section 3 include monopolistic completion with Calvo pricing (Calvo, 1983) 
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and/or costly price adjustment (Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987), wage or price contracting (Taylor, 1979, 
1980), asymmetric information (Lucas, 1975), liquidity constraints (Zeldes, 1989) and allow aggregate 
demand to feature more prominently in adjustment. These new Classical or Keynesian DSGE models are 
given additional features such as price indexation (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005), habit 
formation (Campbell and Cochrane, 2000), a financial accelerator (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 
1996), capacity constraints (Gilchrist and Williams, 2000) and various other strategic complementarities 
(Cooper and John, 1988) to allow the analysis to capture the higher degree of persistence observed in 
the data.  It follows that the welfare gains possible from policy in these models will be a function of the 
types of imperfections built into the analysis.  
The difference in approach and emphasis within DSGE modeling can be illustrated by two recent 
papers.  In Uhlig (2010) a DSGE model incorporating real business cycle features is used to evaluate the 
size of government spending and tax multipliers.  Applying estimates by Cogan et al (2009) of the size of 
the recent US fiscal stimulus package, Uhlig finds fiscal spending multipliers that are positive in the short 
run but become both negative and largely so over the long run. The positive multiplier effect in the short 
run is driven by the negative wealth effect on labour supply (spending is initially funded by government 
borrowing) and the long run negative effect on output arises from the higher levels of distortionary 
taxation needed to pay off higher short run borrowing.  The tax alternative has a smaller short run effect 
but remains positive over the long run.  Fernandez-Villaverde (2010), on the other hand, introduces 
financial frictions (arising from asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders) into a new 
Keynesian DSGE model that incorporates Calvo pricing and habit persistence. The financial friction adds 
a ‘Fischer effect’ to firms in the model so that the effect on aggregate demand that would typically arise 
from an increase in government spending (with price stickiness) is magnified by a reduction in real firm 
indebtedness (as the price level increases unexpectedly).  This reduces the degree of crowding out in 
private investment.  On the other hand, a reduction in labour taxes lowers inflation, increases real firm 
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indebtedness and hence the finance premium.  This works to offset the otherwise expansionary effects 
on output. For this reason spending multipliers become stronger than tax multipliers.           
While the usefulness of DSGE modeling to the analysis of fiscal policy may seem apparent, DSGE 
modeling has been directed primarily at monetary policy, analyzing such issues as alternative money 
rules and inflation targeting.  An August 2010 Econlit search for DSGE models, for example, yielded 426 
entries, which fell to 25 when the search was restricted to fiscal policy (with none arising earlier than 
2005).  One typical use of DSGE modeling is represented by the work by Mertens and Ravn (2009) who 
use DSGE modeling to evaluate what frictions would be needed to account for the observation that 
unanticipated tax reductions generate persistent expansionary effects in output, consumption and 
investment while anticipated tax cuts produce contractions in output, hours worked and investment at 
implementation (with expansion only thereafter).  In their model the addition of adjustment costs, 
liquidity constraints and consumption habits were needed to replicate the observed pattern.  In a similar 
vein, Chahrour, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2009) use a DSGE model to evaluate the hypothesis that the 
different sized tax multipliers found empirically by structural VARs versus those using the ‘narrative 
approach’ are due to differences in their assumed reduced-form transmission mechanisms rather than 
to differences in their shock identification schemes. Their model allows them to reject differences in 
reduced forms and thus conclude that the observed differences in the estimated multipliers are due 
either to the different models failing to identify the same tax shocks or to small-sample uncertainty.  
In work more applicable to the recent financial crisis, Werner, Szekely and Turrini (2010) 
investigate empirically the role played by fiscal policy across 56 countries during banking crises for the 
period 1970-2008.  They then use DSGE simulations to provide an interpretation for their empirical 
finding that the strong expansionary impact of fiscal policy during banking crises is not driven by 
underutilized resources.  Rather they find that if agents are constrained in their borrowing by the value 
of their collateral, fiscal multipliers during banking crises will be higher (because the fiscal expansion has 
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the additional effect of increasing the collateral value of collateral-constrained households thus boosting 
demand via a relaxation of lending constraints by banks).18 Erceg and Linde (2010) use a DSGE model to 
examine the related issue of whether fiscal policy will get a “free ride” in conditions of a liquidity trap. In 
a model where the duration of the trap is dependent on the size of the fiscal stimulus, they show that 
even if the multiplier is initially high for small increases in government spending it may decrease 
substantially at higher spending levels. Hence it becomes crucial to distinguish between the average and 
the marginal spending multiplier. Similarly Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009) explore explicitly 
the consequences for the government spending multiplier of the zero interest rate bound.  Using a 
calibrated DSGE model with wage and price frictions, habit formation, variable capacity, and investment 
costs of adjustment, they show that when the central bank follows a Taylor rule the fiscal multiplier is 
typically less than one. However once the zero interest bound is hit (so that expansionary spending does 
not raise the nominal rate of interest) the multiplier becomes much larger.19
Finally, while fiscal and monetary policies are most often discussed separately, it is important to 
recognize that monetary and fiscal policies are necessarily linked through the government budget 
constraint. This observation has led to a literature exploring the implications of one policy being 
subservient to the other (Christ, 1968; Sargent and Wallace, 1987; Leeper, 1991).  In this context, 
Resende and Rebei (2008) use a DSGE model to explore the implications of having fiscal policy dominate 
monetary policy.  In their model with price stickiness and non-zero trend inflation, Resende and Rebei 
use a simple parameter to represent the fraction of government debt that must be backed by current 
and future budget surpluses versus the fraction financed by seigniorage.   The results of varying this 
    
                                                          
18  Note that this reinforces the mechanism used by Fernandez-Villaverde (2010) for the lending rather than 
borrowing side of the market. 
19  In this case the increase in government spending increases both output and prices. The expectation of inflation 
then lowers the real interest rate and increases aggregate demand further through increased private spending.  
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parameter in their DSGE model suggest significant welfare losses for countries that exhibit a high degree 
of fiscal dominance—in their sample Mexico and South Korea versus the U.S. and Canada.20
 ii. Empirical Studies of Short Run Fiscal Policy 
 
Much of our knowledge of the effects of fiscal intervention on the economy derives from VAR 
analysis.  The classic is the work of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) who built a three variable structural 
VAR (featuring G,T, and GDP) to isolate the effect of exogenous shocks to taxes (T) and government 
spending (G) on GDP in the U.S. between 1960:1 and 1997:4.   Because simultaneous contemporary 
effects arise among the three variables, all VAR estimations result in compacted coefficients that require 
additional assumptions for identification.  Blanchard and Perotti used a recognition lag reinforced by 
administrative information on the timing of taxes and transfers to identify the automatic response of G 
and T to Y and so isolate fiscal shocks. Their results suggest that both increases in government spending 
and reductions in taxes result in relatively small, similarly sized positive multiplier effects on output. In 
part this is because fiscal shocks impact adversely on private investment. Perotti (2005) extended this 
analysis to the set of OECD countries and found similar results but with a tendency for fiscal multipliers 
to decline in size after 1980.21
It is important to recognize that the VAR approach seeks to identify only the effects of fiscal 
policy shocks--shifts in spending and/or taxes--unrelated to the response of policy to developments in 
the economy.  Thus if short run fiscal policy were characterized completely by a feedback rule from 
 Studies by such authors as Benassy-Quere and Cimadomo (2006) that 
extend the investigation to other countries and longer time frames tend to find expenditure multipliers 
that are weak and often negative over longer durations. 
                                                          
20  It should be noted that DSGE modeling assumes that the behavior of the system out of equilibrium is consistent 
with the behavior underlying long run equilibrium.  The type of behavior that arises in periods of financial crisis has 
suggested to some writers that ‘out of the corridor’ the behavior of the economic system may be quite different 
and call for a special role for fiscal policy.  On this see Leijonhufvud (2009).  
21 As an alternative to specifying the identification conditions, Fatás and Mihov (2001) use a Cholesky 
ordering to identify fiscal shocks and similarly find increases in government expenditures to be expansionary. 
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cyclical activity in the economy, there would be no exogenous policy shock and VAR methodology would 
conclude that fiscal policy did not matter.  Yet much of the interest in fiscal policy and its design is 
precisely because we desire an endogenous response by policy to the state of the economy. Hence 
while a fiscal policy shock may not cause output to vary much, it need not follow that fiscal policy is 
unimportant. The way the economy responds to non-policy shocks may depend importantly on the way 
fiscal policy is structured to respond to the cycle.22
An alternative to the VAR method for isolating fiscal policy has been to use political speeches 
and/or legislative actions to identify the timing and duration of tax and spending changes.  Ramey and 
Shapiro (1998) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) use this “narrative approach” to isolate 
political events and find significant and positive short-run spending effects on U.S. output and 
consumption.  More recently, Romer and Romer (2010) use a similar approach to separate changes in 
taxation that arise for reasons related to economic conditions from those that arise for other exogenous 
reasons. Using only the latter, they find that their exogenous tax increases are highly contractionary, 
producing larger and more significant effects than when all tax increases were used.  In a similar vein, 
Alesina and Ardagna (2009) focus on “large changes” in fiscal stance to assess the relative effect of 
government spending versus taxes on output growth and deficits in OECD countries from 1970-2007.  
They find that tax cuts are more likely to increase output growth than spending increases (while 
spending decreases are more likely than tax increases to reduce deficits).   
 
The large differences in multiplier sizes found under these two approaches are quite striking and 
have generated strong efforts to resolve these differences. Tenhofen and Wolff (2007), for example, 
reconcile the strong multiplier effects under the narrative approach with the weak multiplier effects 
arising in VARs by arguing that anticipations are missing from the VAR framework.  By modeling 
expectations formation within the VAR framework, Tenhofen and Wolff show that once the model 
                                                          
22  On different meaning for fiscal multipliers, see Hansen (1973).   
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allows for one-period-ahead anticipation, shocks to non-defense government spending can result in 
significant increases in U.S. consumption (and hence larger multipliers).  Others have worked to extend 
the dimensionality of spending and taxes, as well as the range of potential outputs, to better capture the 
complexities of the multipliers at work.23
iii. Short Run Fiscal Policy and Public Choice 
   
Public choice adds to the analysis of short term fiscal policy by considering “the processes 
through which individual choices are transmitted, combined, and transformed into collective outcomes” 
(Buchanan, [1967] 1987, p. xi).  It asks to what extent do the cyclical expenditure and tax policies set by 
bureaucrats charged with implementing the wishes of political parties depart from the decision making 
implied by DSGE analysis or from the objectives embodied in the design of political and bureaucratic 
institutions. More generally it asks in what way the form of the political process/institutional framework 
feeds back on policy choices and whether the incentives or design of bureaucratic decision making can 
be altered in ways that will improve efficiency and welfare? 
The traditional reasons for expecting an independent political effect on policy decisions are 
based on either opportunistic or partisan reasons for why a political party would wish to influence 
economic policy.24
                                                          
23  See the recent work of Afonso and Sousa (2009) and Afonso and Furceri (2008). 
 Dealing first with opportunism, Nordhaus (1975) argued that an incumbent political 
party would use its control over policy to attempt to gain votes opportunistically by increasing aggregate 
demand and so output in the period immediately prior to each election.  This would work in presence of 
information costs if myopic voters associate higher incomes/lower unemployment with more capable 
politicians.  Then because the benefit of remaining in office is independent of the ideology of the party 
24  See Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997, particularly pages 36 and 62) for a convenient summary of opportunistic 
and partisan political theories and associated empirical tests.  Haynes and Stone (1990) suggest that partisan and 
opportunistic effects may not be separable, where interdependence can be tested for with interaction terms.  
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in power, opportunism predicts higher rates of real output growth and/or lower unemployment rates in 
the period leading into elections--the appearance of a political business cycle.  Following the rational 
expectations revolution, however, it was recognized that the continued use of pre-election spending 
would be anticipated such that systematic use would be ineffective in influencing voters and/or output.  
Since that time a variation of that hypothesis has evolved, rational opportunism (Rogoff, 1990), that 
uses short run asymmetric information with respect to political competence to motivate an equilibrium 
budget cycle.  In this case, knowledge of their superior competence leads more competent politicians to 
use higher pre-election spending/promise lower taxes as a signal.  The ability to verify competence and 
expose cheating ex post makes this behavioral strategy feasible over the longer run and thus generates 
an equilibrium political budget (rather than output) cycle on average.25
The second major strand of political influence on fiscal policy argues that the ideology of the 
political party in power matters (Hibbs, 1977).  In the case of two contending political parties, the left of 
center party would be expected to spend more when in power than its more conservative rival. Hence 
the test for traditional partisanship becomes a positive sign on the coefficient of a dummy variable 
representing time period when the more liberal party is in power. However because any predictable 
policy stance must ultimately be recognized by voters, higher government spending from left wing 
governments will be adjusted to voters and become ineffective. For this reason rational partisan political 
theories refine the traditional hypothesis by arguing that only so long as the electoral outcome is 
uncertain will the realization of a more liberal (conservative) political party victory generate an 
unexpected boost to (contraction in) aggregate output or inflation (Alesina, 1987; Alesina, Roubini, and 
Cohen, 1997). The size of that effect will depend upon: (a) the degree of surprise in the election result; 
and (b) the passage of time since the election, since the realized outcome will be incorporated in revised 
expectations. 
  
                                                          
25 See J. von Hagen (2010) for the prediction of a ‘projection’ cycle arising from the institutional incentives of the 
Stability and Growth Pact of the European Union.  
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The two sets of political hypotheses described above have generated numerous tests, the 
results of which have been quite mixed.26  In general, tests for opportunism in output or unemployment 
have been unsuccessful, while tests of rational opportunism and its prediction of a political budget cycle 
are only somewhat more successful (Drazen 2001).27  The relative lack of success in finding a political 
business/budget cycle has led to various refinements of the basic hypothesis. For example, Frey and 
Schneider (1978) have argued that political parties have multiple objectives besides retaining power so 
that the pursuit of opportunism will come at the cost of leaving other objectives/promises unfulfilled.  
This implies that opportunism will be tried only in those cases where elections are close.28  Abrams and 
Iossifov (2006), on the other hand, focus on coordination costs.  For them an important principal-agent 
problem arises between politicians and policy makers implying that the implementation of opportunism 
will be more likely when the decision making agents share ideologies (measured as belonging to the 
same political party).29 On yet another dimension, Shi and Svensson (2006) and Brender and Drazen 
(2005) argue that cross-sectional evidence for the existence of a political budget cycle is explained 
primarily by its strength in lesser versus more developed democracies.  This is seen as consistent with 
the hypothesis that relatively underdeveloped political institutions in newer democracies have weaker 
institutional controls over opportunism and hence generate more pronounced budget cycles.30
                                                          
26  See, for example, Serletis and Afxentiou (1998) who argue for the complete absence of any systematic effects in 
Canada. 
  Still 
others have questioned the statistical basis for cross-country studies that find no budget or output cycle 
by arguing that these studies do not allow for a sufficient degree of heterogeneity among the countries 
being tested (Bayar and Smeets, 2009).  
27  See Lagona and Padovano (2008) who extend the argument to predict a political legislative cycle.  
28  See also Aidt, Veiga and Goncalves (2009). 
29  While this argument is developed for monetary policy, the same argument could be applied to fiscal policy.   
30  Fatas and Mihov (2003) produce evidence from a cross country study of 91 countries that legislative constraints 
on ‘aggressive’ discretionary fiscal policy have been successful in reducing the volatility of output and increasing 
economic growth. 
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A more serious identification issue arises when the timing of each election is not predetermined.  
Hence in parliamentary systems, for example, opportunistic behavior suggests not only that pre-election 
policy may be used to manipulate or signal voters but also that the election call may be timed to take 
advantage of favorable economic circumstance. The latter possibility has generated a theoretical and 
empirical literature in the political science under the headings of election timing and cabinet or 
parliamentary duration (Smith, 1996; Kayser, 2005; Ferris and Voia, 2009).  When election timing is 
endogenous, the direction of causation in the statistical association arising between economic outcomes 
and election dates becomes complex and more problematic (Ferris and Voia, forthcoming).  
Other dimensions of political decision making process that may feedback on opportunism and 
fiscal policy have also been examined.  For example, Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2004) argue that 
democracies with proportional versus majority voting rules will have less control over spending plans 
because their governing coalition is inherently more unstable/fragmentary.  Kontopoulos and Perotti 
(1999) make a similar case for federal versus unitary governments.  Both imply a diminished ability to 
use fiscal tools for opportunism. 
When evidence of political influence on fiscal response is found, the evidence is more likely to 
be for partisan effects than for opportunism. A typical conclusion, quoted here from Alesina (1989, 
p.55), is that “when [opportunistic and partisan] theories are confronted with actual cycles in a number 
of industrial countries, the pattern of inflation, unemployment, output, and budget deficits indicates 
that partisan policy making is a fairly widespread phenomenon, with more limited evidence that 
electoral preoccupations result in major fluctuations”.31
                                                          
31  However, see Heckelman (2006) who challenges the statistical tests used most often to test for rational 
partisanship. 
 Not only have partisan effects been found by 
many authors at the national level (Winer, Tofias, Grofman and Aldrich, 2008), but partisanship has also 
been found at state and provincial levels (Besley and Case, 2003; Kneebone and McKenzie, 2001).  Of 
growing interest is the emergence of a wider political spectrum than simply left/right ideology for 
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partisanship.  For example, Brauninger (2005) broadens the partitioning of partisanship from the left 
/right distinction usually used to ask whether program preferences more generally differ across political 
parties in ways that are sufficient to generate a spending cycle.  His results suggest that more subtle 
dimensions of partisanship can play a role in generating predictable party influences on policy and/or 
output. Similarly, Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) use coordination cost arguments such as those 
used by Abrams and Iossifov (2006) to document partisanship in intergovernmental transfers (for Spain). 
Finally, in an interesting application of DSGE-type analysis to these public choice issues, Blomberg and 
Hess (2003) modify a real business cycle model to include both partisan and competency effects and 
generate characteristic variable movements that conformed (better than did the model without these 
elements) to post-WWII US data.  
While opportunism and partisanship have occupied most empirical attention, the relationship 
between political competition and economic outcomes has had a long history in public choice and this 
intersects with the short run by raising the question of whether the degree of political competition 
matters for the extent and/or design of fiscal policy. That is, not only is political competition needed to 
align political incentives with household demands in relation to long run government size, but political 
competition may police rent seeking in the scaling of policies designed to respond to the business 
cycle.32  In partial answer, greater political competition has been found to provide a greater the degree 
of transparency in decision making allowing for more informed monitoring of government actions (Alt, 
Lassen and Rose, 2006). This may be one of the underlying factors behind the finding by Besley, Persson, 
and Sturm (2005) that greater political competition was essential for promoting the enhanced economic 
performance of the southern US states by producing higher qualitative choices among policies, policy 
instruments and governors.33
                                                          
32  See Svaleryd and Vlachos (2009) who find evidence of rent-seeking falling with greater electoral competition in 
Sweden.  
 Looking more narrowly at government spending, Ferris, Park and Winer 
33  Similar effects have been found by Padovano and Ricciuti (2009) for Italy and Rumi (2009) for Argentina.   
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(2008) find evidence in Canada that political competition is a significant explanatory variable in both 
long and short run dimensions of fiscal policy.  There a smaller electoral victory margin (the measure of 
political competition) is associated not only with a smaller sized government but also with less spending 
variation about that smaller size (independent of party type).34
iv. Measurement Issues for testing hypotheses the role of Politics in Fiscal Policy 
 The latter finding is reinforced by studies 
such as Galli and Padavano (2002) who find that the sizes of fiscal deficits respond to the degree of 
government fragmentation (another measure of competition) and Skilling and Zeckhauser (2002) who 
study differences in debt accumulation between the US and Japan and conclude that political 
competition encourages fiscal prudence.  Finally, other economists have investigated the relationship 
between political competition and partisanship. Both Solé-Ollé (2006) for Spain and Dubois, Prince and 
Paty (2007) for France find that greater political competition reduced the degree of partisanship found 
in fiscal choices.  
The key difficulty in testing hypotheses that relate economic and political variables such as those 
discussed above is that economic variables typically grow through time while political/electoral variables 
usually do not.  Hence one would not expect a stationary or I(0) political variable (like partisan party 
type or an election date) to be able to provide a meaningful economic or statistical explanation for a 
trending or non-stationary I(1) economic variable (like GDP or government size).  In order to apply the 
test procedures typically used in statistical analysis, political variables need to be related to stationary 
economic measures.  The testing of political influence in relation to either short run fiscal policy and/or 
economic growth would then seem to present less of a concern because the measures used to describe 
fiscal policy allow alike stationary variables to be juxtaposed in a meaningful statistical manner.   
                                                          
34   See also Dickson (2009). 
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Hence if the stationary variables used to measure concepts like fiscal policy and the business 
cycle were unique and unambiguous, a test of political influence on fiscal policy would be relatively 
straightforward.  However because fiscal intervention arises as a departure in expenditure or taxation 
from long run equilibrium size and because the cycle itself represents a variation in output/growth, 
employment, or inflation rates relative to its longer run equilibrium, the measures of fiscal intervention 
and the cycle cannot arise independent of a theory of their long run size.  It follows that to test 
hypotheses that relate political variables to either the scale of fiscal intervention or the business cycle, 
longer run equilibrium values must be removed from time series data.  
In practice nonstationary variables are transformed into stationarity variables either by 
deterministic detrending, by taking a first difference, or by using a filtering technique such as the 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter.  The separately transformed variables are then tested against each other.  
Unfortunately, the three techniques do not often generate the same measure of fiscal policy or even 
imply the same stage of the business cycle.  An example of the differences that can arise among the 
different measures is illustrated below for the case of the logarithm of Canadian real GNP (between 
1870 and 2009).35
insert Figure 1 about here 
 By inspection it apparent that the resulting cycles are not coincident and that the use 
of different detrending techniques can result in different measured relationships. What is worse is that 
the mechanical use of a detrending technique can itself produce spurious cycles in the detrended data 
(Harvey and Jaeger, 1993), a particular issue when the HP filter is used on time series that are difference 
stationary (Cogley and Nason, 1995).  While tests exist to distinguish between trend and difference 
stationary time series and hence point to the appropriate detrending technique, in many cases the lack 
of power in these tests means that it is often difficult to distinguish between them. 
                                                          
35   Note that all three time series are I(0) with ADF statistics of -3.05 for the deviation from time trend, -6.60 for 
first differences and -8.03 for HP cycle.  The critical value of the Mackinnon test statistic at 1% is -2.58.  
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 From a public choice perspective, the important reason why long run government size has not 
remained stationary through time is because the factors underlying and so determining long run size 
have changed, sometimes systematically and sometimes more dramatically.  This is the premise of 
models built to explain the growth of government and/or its pattern of evolution through time 
(Borcherding, 1985; Kau and Rubin, 1981; Ferris and West, 1996).  It follows that an alternative way to 
filter the long run from time series that combine both is to explicitly model the long run relationship.  To 
the extent that the two sets of considerations are separable and a long run model can be identified, the 
subtraction of the long run estimate from the aggregate measure would result in a short run series 
purged of predictable long run variations.  More accurately, the procedure would generate a short run 
cycle contingent on the theory utilized to isolate the long run.  
The empirical implementation of this approach requires both a theory of government size and 
cointegration analysis.  For example, public choice theory suggests a number of variables that would 
serve as proxies for the changes in tastes and composition of the electorate underlying the demand for 
government services and for the changes in technology/organization that have altered the cost of 
providing government services (and/or collecting taxes).  By and large these variables are nonstationary 
so that regressing them against government size raises the likelihood that the resulting estimates and 
implied relationships will be spurious. However cointegration theory tells us that if a linear combination 
of these nonstationary variables is stationary, then that set of variables will form a cointegrating 
relationship and the equation estimate can be interpreted as a long run equilibrium relationship among 
these variables.  The residuals of this equation must (by definition) be stationary and as such represent 
only transitory departures from the long run equilibrium relationship embodied in the cointegration 
equation.  It follows that the residuals become a measure of short run fiscal intervention and random 
disturbances that can be used both to test theories of fiscal response to the business cycle and to test 
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for the response (or lack thereof) to the I(0) measures of political opportunism, partisanship and/or 
political competition.36
One example of the difference between the residuals generated by a cointegration model of 
long run size and the residuals arising from the use of a Hodrick-Prescott trend is illustrated below for 
case of the log of real per capita government (expenditure) size over the post WW2 period in Canada.
 
37
insert Figure 2 about here 
  
As that figure illustrates, the measures are not dissimilar but do contain some significant differences in 
size and timing.  The case for using cointegrated residuals is that unlike the HP residuals, cointegration 
residuals are generated with the use of more relevant information than the just the internal 
characteristics of the series itself and thus have a an interpretable meaning that allows for potentially 
more insightful interpretations with respect to the short run.  Cointegration residuals have then been 
used together with first differences in an error correction model to represent a more precise description 
of the systematic process of short run adjustment about long run size. 
Finally a recurring theme of this paper has been that the short and long run reasons for 
government spending/taxation interrelate both conceptually and within the same measure.  This 
suggests that rather than using a long run theory to separate the time series into two distinct parts and 
testing the two types of theories separately, the two hypotheses should be tested together on the data.  
This can be done by combining the separate stages of the Engel-Granger error correction model and 
estimating the long run model of government size at the same time the transition process about the 
long run equilibrium is estimated.  
5. Conclusion 
                                                          
36  Note that the definition of fiscal policy here includes endogenous as well as exogenous responses to the 
business cycle.  As such it captures a much broader definition of fiscal response than does the measure isolated in 
SVARs. 
37  The model uses the cointegration relationship used in Ferris, Park and Winer (2008) estimated over the 1948-
2008 time period. 
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 In this paper I have focused on how public choice intersects traditional macro analysis both in 
relation to the determination of long run government size and in relation to the business cycle.  By 
focusing on macroeconomic concerns, however, this approach has been unable to do justice to the 
public choice literature concerned with the consequences for fiscal policy of differences in electoral 
processes and/or political party structures among and across groups of countries (e.g., Efthyvoulou, 
2008 and Redzepagic and Llorca, 2007).  Similarly little attention has been given to the rapidly growing 
literature on the significance for policy of particular differences in the institutional and organizational 
structure of decision-making within the bureau (e.g., Besley and Persson, 2009).  Instead the analysis has 
focussed on how traditional public choice considerations such as partisanship, opportunism and political 
competition intersect with the measure of traditional countercyclical macroeconomic policy and the 
different techniques used within macro to address traditional public choice concerns.  The particular 
concern of this paper has been to highlight the issues involved in measuring the scale and intensity of 
short run fiscal intervention and the analytic problems raised by having long run policies related to size 
and shorter run policies related to stabilization combined in a single fiscal measure.  It reflects the belief 
that unless there is a greater recognition of the issues involved in measuring short run fiscal intervention 
it will be difficult to establish any consensus on the scale of actual government intervention that arises 
at any particular point in time.  Without this there will be even less chance of agreeing on the effect (or 
lack of effect) of different fiscal stimuli on the business cycle. 
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Figure 1 
Alternative Cycles in the Log of Canadian real GNP 
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Figure 2 
Alternative Measures of Fiscal Intervention as a Fraction of GDP: Canada 1948-2008 
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